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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 25, 2019, the Texas A&M Journal of Property Law 
and the Center for Law and Intellectual Property at Texas A&M 
University School of Law jointly organized the “Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, Patent Protection, and Regulatory Exclusivities” 
Symposium.1 Although none of the organizers and participants could 




 * Copyright © 2021 Peter K. Yu. Regents Professor of Law and 
Communication and Director, Center for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M 
University. Part III of this Article was presented at the “Pharmaceutical Innovation, 
Patent Protection, and Regulatory Exclusivities” Symposium at Texas A&M 
University School of Law. The Article draws on research the Author conducted for 
earlier articles in the Florida State University Law Review and the University of the 
Pacific Law Review. The Author is grateful to Saurabh Vishnubhakat and the past 
and present members of the Texas A&M Journal of Property Law, in particular 
Jessica Bonds, Cameron Saenz, Katlyn Humbarger, Karina Rios, Christian 
Martinez, and Karen Alday for assistance in making this Symposium possible. 
 1. In addition to the four contributors to this special issue, the Symposium 
participants included Professors Gabriel Eckstein, Erika Lietzan, Glynn Lunney, 
Emily Morris, Arti Rai, John Thomas, and Saurabh Vishnubhakat. 
 2. It is worth noting that the public health community has made repeated calls 
for better pandemic preparedness since the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS). See, e.g., THOMAS ABRAHAM, TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
PLAGUE: THE STORY OF SARS 140 (2007) (describing SARS as “a dress rehearsal 
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consensus that the rapid changes in the pharmaceutical landscape and 
our continuous struggle to strike a proper balance between proprietary 
protection and public access in the public health arena deserves 
scholarly, policy, and regulatory attention. 
To help contextualize the articles included in this special issue 
and to inform readers about the inspirations and motivations behind 
the Symposium, Part II of this Introductory Article explores the 
different modalities of protection—in particular the role of patents and 
regulatory exclusivities in providing the needed incentives to 
pharmaceutical developers. Part III identifies three sets of challenges 
that affect the future of pharmaceutical innovation at both the domestic 
and international levels. Part IV utilizes a very recent event—the 
COVID-19 pandemic—to illustrate the wide array of policy options 
and possibilities both within and outside the intellectual property 
system. This Part makes salient the nexus between the domestic and 
international debates on pharmaceutical innovation. 
II. MODALITIES 
To provide pharmaceutical developers with the needed 
incentives, the intellectual property system grants two predominant 
forms of protection: patents and regulatory exclusivities. Patents 
provide pharmaceutical developers with limited protection to enable 
them to recoup the time, effort, and resources expended in research 
and development. Although critics of the patent system have 
 
for the more serious threat posed by a new influenza pandemic”); STEFAN ELBE, 
PANDEMICS, PILLS, AND POLITICS: GOVERNING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 34 
(2018) (“The episodic recurrence of … influenza pandemics leads many experts to 
believe that new flu pandemics occur roughly once every couple of decades.”); 
SONIA SHAH, PANDEMIC: TRACKING CONTAGIONS, FROM CHOLERA TO EBOLA AND 
BEYOND 8 (2016) (noting a survey by epidemiologist Larry Brilliant that “90 percent 
of epidemiologists said that a pandemic that will sicken 1 billion, kill up to 165 
million, and trigger a global recession that could cost up to $3 trillion would occur 
sometime in the next two generations”); WORLD HEALTH ORG., AN R&D 
BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION TO PREVENT EPIDEMICS: PLAN OF ACTION 22 (2016), 
https://www.who.int/blueprint/about/r_d_blueprint_plan_of_action.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KR24-UNQL] (including “[h]ighly pathogenic emerging 
coronaviruses relevant to humans” on the list of diseases that are “to be urgently 
addressed”). Every year, my university colleagues at the Scowcroft Institute of 
International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service hold a 
pandemic policy summit and publish a white paper on pandemic preparedness and 
response. See Papers, PANDEMIC & BIOSECURITY POL’Y PROGRAM, 
https://bush.tamu.edu/scowcroft/programs/papers/ [https://perma.cc/5B8Z-RSG2] 
(collecting the white papers). 
  
2021]          MODALITIES, CHALLENGES, AND POSSIBILITIES               3 
 
questioned this utilitarian justification,3 economists and other 
commentators have widely recognized the need to offer strong patent 
protection in the pharmaceutical and chemical sectors due to the 
significant risks and high research-and-development costs involved.4 
It is therefore no surprise that the patent system has provided 
pharmaceutical products with longstanding protection, which can be 
traced back decades to the time when the synthetic dyestuff industry 
sought to protect its inventions.5 
Unlike patents, regulatory exclusivities—in the form of either 
market or data exclusivities6—are of more recent origin. While such 
exclusivities vary from country to country, and at times go beyond 
intellectual property protection into the area of drug regulation, the 
international regime for market or data exclusivities did not begin to 
emerge until the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights7 (“TRIPS Agreement”).8 
 
 3. See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY (2008) (arguing that copyrights and patents are non-essential to 
creativity and innovation and detrimental to the common good). 
 4. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 106–09 (2008) (noting the 
important role of patents in supporting innovation in the pharmaceutical and 
chemical industries); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND 
HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 50 (2009) (“[S]tudies found that patents play a 
major role in supporting innovation in only a few industries, most notably chemistry 
and pharmaceuticals.”). 
 5. See GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE 
SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 59–60 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing 
the efforts to protect inventions relating to synthetic dyestuffs and how such efforts 
have paved the way for later protections for pharmaceuticals). 
 6. See Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 91, 103 (2016) (“Some use ‘data exclusivity’ to refer to statutory prohibitions 
on submission of abbreviated applications and ‘market exclusivity’ to refer to 
statutory prohibitions on approval of abbreviated applications and by extension 
market entry.”); Peter K. Yu, Data Exclusivities and the Limits to TRIPS 
Harmonization, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 641, 674–75 (2019) [hereinafter Yu, Limits 
to TRIPS Harmonization] (noting the distinction between “data exclusivities” and 
“market exclusivities”); Peter K. Yu, Data Exclusivities in the Age of Big Data, 
Biologics, and Plurilaterals, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. ARGUENDO 22, 27 (2018) 
[hereinafter Yu, Data Exclusivities] (“While [market exclusivity] prevents the 
marketing of a new drug based on the utilization of or reliance on previously 
submitted clinical trial data, [data exclusivity] prevents the utilization or reliance of 
those data during the exclusivity term.”). 
 7. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 8. See CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 351 (2d ed. 2020) 
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Article 39.3 provides pharmaceutical developers with protections for 
the undisclosed test or other data they submit to regulatory authorities 
for the marketing approval of their products.9 In the first decade of the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”), Article 70.9 further granted 
exclusive marketing rights to pharmaceutical developers for up to five 
years in countries that had not yet completed the transition to offer 
patent protection to pharmaceutical products.10 
Because of their fairly late arrival, regulatory exclusivities 
have traditionally been added to patents as an alternative or a 
supplemental form of protection.11 Such addition is understandable 
 
(“[T]he … international regime on undisclosed information … is one of the most 
significant innovations brought about by the TRIPS Agreement.”); U.N. CONF. ON 
TRADE & DEV.–INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. PROJECT ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS & SUSTAINABLE DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS 
AND DEVELOPMENT 522 (2005) [hereinafter TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK] (“TRIPS is 
the first international convention specifically imposing obligations on undisclosed 
information, including test data.”); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (2001) (noting that the 
protection of undisclosed information “has never been the subject of any multilateral 
agreement” until the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement). As recounted in the 
Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, put together by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development and the International Centre on Trade and 
Sustainable Development: 
Differences in pre-existing comparative law were even greater 
with regard to test data relating to pharmaceuticals and 
agrochemicals. Only a few countries had developed rules on the 
matter before the negotiation of TRIPS. Thus, the USA introduced 
a regulatory data protection regime for pesticides in 1972, and in 
1984 adopted regulatory exclusivity provisions for medicines. The 
latter provided for five years of exclusivity for new chemical 
entities, and three years for data filed in support of authorizations 
based on new clinical research relating to chemical entities which 
have already been approved for therapeutic use. The [European 
Union] member states provided exclusivity protection for the data 
filed in support of marketing authorization for pharmaceuticals 
since 1987. 
TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 8, at 522. 
 9. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39.3. 
 10. Id. art. 70.9; see also U.N. Sec’y-Gen.’s High-Level Panel on Access to 
Medicines, Promoting Innovation and Access to Health Technologies, at 17 (Sept. 
2016) (“In 1986, when trade negotiations leading to the establishment of the WTO 
commenced, 50 countries did not provide patent protection on pharmaceutical 
products.”). 
 11. See Yu, Limits to TRIPS Harmonization, supra note 6, at 662–64 (discussing 
the “question concern[ing] whether data exclusivity protections continue even when 
the relevant pharmaceutical product is no longer protected by a patent, such as when 
that product is in the public domain or when the previously granted patent has been 
subsequently invalidated”). 
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considering the different nature of and justifications for this extra layer 
of protection.12 While patents focus on inventions that have met the 
novelty, non-obviousness, and utility requirements,13 regulatory 
exclusivities target products that do not fit well with, or do not receive 
adequate protection from, the patent system. An oft-cited example in 
recent years is biological products, which many policymakers, 
industry leaders, and commentators have considered insufficiently 
protected under existing patent law.14 
While it is easy to understand the concerns about inadequate 
protection for pharmaceutical innovations, and the benefits of 
advances in medicines and health technologies, the overprotection of 
intellectual property rights can greatly reduce public access to 
essential medicines.15 Indeed, the access-to-medicines debate has 
remained vibrant and highly contentious since the TRIPS Agreement 
entered into force more than two decades ago. Particularly notable are 
problems relating to therapeutic treatments for HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa.16 These problems 
 
 12. See Daniel Gervais, The Patent Option, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 357, 357 
(2019) (“The patent regime is one-size-fits-all; it protects new, useful, and 
nonobvious inventions subject to sufficiency of disclosure. In contrast, the data 
exclusivity regime has both a different target (only pharmaceuticals) and purpose 
(efficacy and safety).”). 
 13. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018) (providing the novelty, non-obviousness, 
and utility requirements); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 27.1 (“[P]atents shall 
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application.”). 
 14. See Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological 
Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 
419, 450–61 (2012) (discussing why patents may not provide sufficient protection 
to biological products); W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: 
Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 527 
(2014) (“[T]he public disclosure required by a patent can lower that entry barrier by 
providing information about both the biologic-specific manufacturing process and 
general manufacturing processes for biologics, making patents particularly 
unattractive.”). 
 15. See Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1563, 1567 n.14 (2013) [hereinafter Yu, Virotech Patents] (collecting 
books on the access-to-medicines problems in relation to the TRIPS Agreement). 
 16. See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health of 14 November 2001, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 
I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration] (“We recognize the gravity of the 
public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, 
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics.”). See generally THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (Obijiofor 
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eventually led to the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health17 in November 2001 and the 
introduction of an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement in December 
2005.18 Domestically, the high drug and healthcare costs have also 
alarmed the sick, the elderly, and the public at large.19 It is therefore 
no surprise that political debates have prominently featured healthcare 
reforms, especially before presidential elections.20 
In view of these ongoing tensions and potential conflicts, 
commentators have actively questioned the wisdom of providing 
regulatory exclusivities on top of the already very strong protection 
for patents under existing law.21 The recent years have also seen 
commentators calling on the incentive framework for pharmaceutical 
innovation to grant drug developers only one form of protection, but 
not both.22 The potential policy choices—and the need for a deeper 
 
Aginam, John Harrington & Peter K. Yu eds., 2013) (collecting articles that discuss 
the access-to-medicines problems in relation to HIV/AIDS). 
 17. Doha Declaration, supra note 16. 
 18. General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 
2005); see also Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 
827, 872–86 (2007) (tracing the development of Article 31bis of the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
 19. See Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 15, at 831 (“Due to aging populations 
and increasing reliance on prescription drugs, developed countries … face 
increasingly ‘strain[ed] government budgets and burden[ed] private health benefits 
systems.’” (quoting Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: 
Developments and Trends in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING 
HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27, 29 (Pedro Roffe 
et al. eds., 2006))). 
 20. See, e.g., Julie Rovner, U.S. Elections 2020: Understanding What’s at Stake 
for Health Care, NPR, Jan. 29, 2020, https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2020/01/29/800652075/u-s-elections-2020-understanding-whats-at-stake-for-
health-care [https://perma.cc/P4GJ-Z94L] (highlighting the key healthcare issues at 
play in the 2020 U.S. presidential election); see also Yu, Virotech Patents, supra 
note 15, at 1565 (noting the controversies surrounding Congress’ adoption of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010 during the Obama Administration). 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 23–30. 
 22. See ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY, AND SECRET HANDSHAKES: THE 
UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 103 (2019) (calling for the 
implementation of “a ‘one and done’ principle for the protection of drug 
innovation”); Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA 
Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399 (2013) (proposing a non-
patent exclusivity system administered by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
to provide incentives in the area of genetic materials); Heled, Patents vs. Statutory 
Exclusivities, supra note 14 (questioning the need for and purpose of having both 
patents and statutory exclusivities in the area of biological products); Yu, The 
International Enclosure Movement, supra note 18, at 895 (“If additional incentives 
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understanding of the different modalities of protection—provided a 
key driving force behind this Symposium. 
For instance, John Thomas, who spoke at the opening panel of 
this Symposium, explored in an earlier article the implications of the 
pharmaceutical industry’s growing preference for regulatory 
exclusivities to patent protection.23 Likewise, Robin Feldman 
documented the rise of “regulatory property” as a new form of 
intellectual property.24 In her latest book, Drugs, Money, and Secret 
Handshakes, Professor Feldman called for the implementation of “a 
‘one and done’ principle for the protection of drug innovation” that 
would require pharmaceutical developers to “choose whether its 
period of exclusivity should be a patent, an orphan drug designation, 
or a period of data exclusivity for safety and efficacy data, or 
something else—but not all of the above and more.”25 In the area of 
genetic materials, Gregory Dolin also proposed a non-patent 
exclusivity system administered by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration to generate the incentives that the patent system 
traditionally provides.26 At the international level, Daniel Gervais 
advanced an innovative proposal that would extend data exclusivities 
if “no patent is applied for or the patentee lets it lapse … [and if an 
abridged version of the] clinical data are made available to the 
public.”27 
Noting the need for more sophisticated analyses of the 
interplay between patents and regulatory exclusivities, Yaniv Heled, 
who participated in this Symposium, questioned in prior work the need 
for and purpose of having both patents and statutory exclusivities in 
the area of biological products.28 In his view, such concurrent 
protection will “waste … societal resources” while “giv[ing] rise to 
 
are provided by the data exclusivity regime, one has to wonder whether patent 
protection should be weakened proportionally to reflect the additional incentives.”); 
Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 777, 
785 (2010) (“[I]f data exclusivity laws are to be adopted, one has to wonder whether 
existing patent rights need to be curtailed proportionally to reflect the additional 
incentives.”). 
 23. John R. Thomas, The End of Patent Medicines: Thoughts on the Rise of 
Regulatory Exclusivities, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 39 (2015). 
 24. Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
53 (2016). 
 25. FELDMAN, supra note 22, at 103. 
 26. Dolin, supra note 22. 
 27. Gervais, supra note 12, at 364. 
 28. Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities, supra note 14. 
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unnecessary and avoidable risks of abuse.”29 To alleviate these 
shortcomings, policymakers should pay greater attention to the 
substitutionary effects of patents and regulatory exclusivities.30 
In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Heled built 
on his earlier research on biological products to evaluate the first 
decade of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, which 
Congress enacted in 2010.31 Using original data and advancing a new 
method for comparing competition in drug markets, this timely article 
“surveys the state of competition in United States biologics markets, 
entry of follow-on biologics … into these markets, and the effects such 
entry has had on biologics prices.”32 The article laments the statute’s 
significant underperformance in comparison with the Hatch–Waxman 
Act of 198433 and its “fail[ure] to achieve its goal of significantly 
increasing access to biologics in the United States.”34 
Taken together, the scholarship in this area has invited us to 
interrogate more deeply the role of patents and regulatory exclusivities 
in pharmaceutical innovation and the interplay between these two 
forms of protection. As the use of personalized medicines and 
biological products becomes more popular and affordable,35 the 
debate on the modalities of protection will only receive more 
scholarly, policy, and regulatory attention. At the international level, 
this debate will also garner greater interest, due in large part to the 
 
 29. Id. at 462 (capitalization omitted); see also Srividhya Ragavan, The Drug 
Debate: Data Exclusivity Is the New Way to Delay Generics, 50 CONN. L. REV. 
CONNTEMPLATIONS 1, 4 (2018) (“[T]he data exclusivity regime can operate in 
parallel with the patent regime to add a layer of protection for the clinical trial 
data.”). 
 30. See CORREA, supra note 8, at 361 (“Data protection systems could, if they 
provided exclusivity, become a partial substitute for patent protection.”); Yu, Limits 
to TRIPS Harmonization, supra note 6, at 663 (“For pharmaceutical products that 
patent law no longer protects, … data exclusivity law could provide substitutional 
protection.”). 
 31. H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 32. Yaniv Heled, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act at 10—A 
Stocktaking, 7 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 81, 83 (2021) [hereinafter Heled, BPCIA at 
10]. 
 33. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, § 156, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 355 (2018)). 
 34. Heled, BPCIA at 10, supra note 32, at 101. 
 35. See Yu, Limits to TRIPS Harmonization, supra note 6, at 689 (“The second 
new technological development, which ‘has … revolutionized the healthcare and 
pharmaceutical industries,’ is the growing importance and popularity of biologics 
and personalized medicines.” (quoting Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 6, at 22)). 
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varied developments in different parts of the world and the fact that 
many countries are only beginning to focus attention on the 
development of biological products.36 
III. CHALLENGES 
Another key inspiration for this Symposium emerges from the 
rapid changes in the domestic and global pharmaceutical landscapes 
and the ongoing challenges posed by new geopolitical and 
technological developments. The scope and length of this Article do 
not allow for an expanded discussion of the myriad challenges that are 
now emerging in the domestic and international pharmaceutical 
arenas. This Part focuses instead on three sets of primary challenges: 
(1) the development of bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade 
agreements; (2) the emergence of technological advances in 
pharmaceutical innovation; and (3) the ongoing and ever-growing 
rivalry between China and the United States. 
A. Non-multilateral Trade Agreements 
The first set of challenges concerns the development of 
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements.37 Particularly 
controversial is the aggressive use of these agreements to push for 
stronger protections for patents and regulatory exclusivities in the past 
two decades.38 Less than a year before this Symposium, Canada, the 
United States, and Mexico signed the United States–Mexico–Canada 
 
 36. Cf. WORLD HEALTH ORG., CHINA POLICIES TO PROMOTE LOCAL 
PRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS AND PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH 19–
21 (2017) [hereinafter WHO CHINA STUDY] (prepared by Frederick Abbott) 
(discussing the growing development of biological products in China). 
 37. For discussions of free trade agreements in the intellectual property context, 
see generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
(Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007); Peter K. Yu, The 
Non-multilateral Approach to International Intellectual Property Normsetting, in 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH 83 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2015); Peter K. Yu, Currents and 
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 323, 392–400 (2004). 
 38. See Yu, Limits to TRIPS Harmonization, supra note 6, at 672–85 (discussing 
the development of bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements to 
strengthen protection for undisclosed test or other data for agrochemical, 
pharmaceutical, and biological products). 
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Agreement39 (“USMCA”),40 which aimed to replace the North 
American Free Trade Agreement.41 Article 20.48 of the USMCA 
provides protection to undisclosed test or other data for 
pharmaceutical products “for at least five years from the date of 
marketing approval of the new pharmaceutical product in the territory 
of the Party.”42 The provision further enhances the protections for new 
clinical information or molecular variations through two alternative 
routes.43 The first route requires signatories to provide protection “for 
a period of at least three years with respect to new clinical information 
submitted as required in support of a marketing approval of a 
previously approved pharmaceutical product covering a new 
indication, new formulation, or new method of administration.”44 The 
second route allows signatories to offer protection “for a period of at 
least five years to new pharmaceutical products that contain a 
chemical entity that has not been previously approved in that Party.”45 
With respect to undisclosed test or other data for biological 
products, Article 20.49 of the now-amended 2018 text provides 
protection “for a period of at least ten years from the date of first 
marketing approval of that product.”46 This provision states explicitly 
that the protection will be extended, 
at a minimum, [to] a product that is produced using 
biotechnology processes and that is, or contains, a 
virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, 
blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic 
 
 39. United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, Can.–Mex.–U.S., Nov. 30, 
2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states- 
mexico-canada-agreement [https://perma.cc/5BPT-SQY2] [hereinafter USMCA]. 
 40. For a student note on the UMSCA from a past member of this Journal, see 
Jordan Jensen, Note, Biologics Under a New NAFTA: How TPP Fixed NAFTA’s 
Intellectual Property Provisions but Not its Investment Provisions, 5 TEX. A&M J. 
PROP. L. 247 (2019) (providing an assessment of the USMCA intellectual property 
and investment provisions in the area of biological products). 
 41. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.–Mex.–U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993); see also USMCA, supra note 39, pmbl. (stipulating the objective 
of “replac[ing] the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement with a 21st Century, 
high standard new agreement to support mutually beneficial trade leading to freer, 
fairer markets, and to robust economic growth in the region” (capitalization 
omitted)). 
 42. USMCA, supra note 39, art. 20.48.1(a). 
 43. Id. art. 20.48.2. 
 44. Id. art. 20.48.2(a). 
 45. Id. art. 20.48.2(b). 
 46. Id. art. 20.49.1. 
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product, protein, or analogous product, for use in 
human beings for the prevention, treatment, or cure of 
a disease or condition.47 
Shortly after this Symposium, the USMCA signatories agreed 
to amend the agreement by removing Article 20.49 and other 
contentious provisions.48 Such removal addressed the concern U.S. 
policymakers had over the agreement’s high protections for biological 
products and their request for the United States Trade Representative 
to “amend the USMCA to increase competition and enhance patient 
access to more affordable prescription drugs,” including biological 
products.49 In the wake of this amendment, the current version of the 
USMCA no longer includes language protecting the undisclosed test 
or other data for biological products. 
Although commentators often criticize bilateral, regional, and 
plurilateral trade agreements for their deleterious effects on 
developing countries, it is important to remember that the binding 
obligations in these agreements constrain the United States the same 
way they constrain other signatories.50 Because the incentive 
framework needed to promote pharmaceutical innovation tends to 
vary according to medical needs, market conditions, and technological 
advances, what works well for today’s industry may not be suitable in 
the future or in the event of a national emergency. A trade agreement 
that allows for a limited set of policy options could be detrimental to 
the United States because it could easily lock the country into outdated 
standards that impede the future development of the local 
pharmaceutical industry.51 Such locked-in standards are particularly 
 
 47. Id. art. 20.49.2 (footnote omitted). 
 48. Protocol of Amendment to the Agreement Between the United States of 
America, the United Mexican States, and Canada art. 3.E, Can.–Mex.–U.S., Dec. 
10, 2019, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/ 
Protocol-of-Amendments-to-the-United-States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X79R-2RRS]. 
 49. Letter from Representative Jan Schakowsky et al. to Robert E. Lighthizer, 
U.S. Trade Representative (July 11, 2019), https://schakowsky.house.gov/sites/ 
schakowsky.house.gov/files/migrated/uploads/lighthizermeds.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/V8JB-88WF]. 
 50. See Anupam Chander, Exporting DMCA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
205, 207 (2006) (“FTA [free trade agreement] obligations, it must be remembered, 
generally apply equally to the United States. Thus, it is possible that the United 
States could run afoul of its own FTAs.”). 
 51. See Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. 
REV. 975, 1066–70 (2011) (lamenting how the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
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problematic in a fast-growing area like biological products.52 Should 
the United States need to adjust these standards beyond what the 
existing agreements permit, it will have to withdraw from those 
agreements, ask its trading partners for support to amend the 
agreements, or face consequences for noncompliance.53 
B. Technological Advances 
The second set of challenges relates to the emergence of 
technological advances in pharmaceutical innovation. Part II already 
acknowledged the ever-increasing popularity of biological products 
and personalized medicines. There are other emergent developments, 
however. For example, a fast-growing number of commentators are 
now exploring the use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) and machine 
learning in the pharmaceutical sector, including for research and 
development.54 Advances in this area have also attracted the attention 
 
Agreement will foreclose opportunities for future legislative reform). 
 52. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement art. 18.51.3, Feb. 4, 2016, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/ 
tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/BU94-JYH6] (“Recognising that international and 
domestic regulation of new pharmaceutical products that are or contain a biologic is 
in a formative stage and that market circumstances may evolve over time ….”). 
 53. See Chander, supra note 50, at 207 (“Should we conclude in the future that 
the [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] anti-circumvention rules [that have been 
built into a FTA] are too constricting, we will have to renegotiate the FTA, flout the 
FTA, or conform to an uncongenial rule.”). 
 54. See Pratap Khedkar & Dharmendra Sahay, Trends in Healthcare and 
Medical Innovation, in GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019: CREATING HEALTHY 
LIVES—THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL INNOVATION 87, 89 (Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 
2019) [hereinafter GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019] (“A third of all AI 
investments in healthcare are projected to be in drug discovery, specifically using 
computer simulation to find better molecules faster. Companies are also beginning 
to leverage AI and data to reduce clinical trial costs and waste, though progress has 
been slower than desired.” (footnote omitted)); WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., 
PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION: 
INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADE 
89 (2d ed. 2020) [hereinafter TRILATERAL STUDY] (“Artificial neural networks … 
have been used in drug discovery for screening compounds in the automated design 
of new classes of medicines and in finding novel uses for known medicines…. AI is 
already being used in the design and analysis of clinical trials.”). For the use of 
artificial intelligence and machine learning in the health area, see generally Ma 
Huateng, Tencent, Application of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data in China’s 
Healthcare Services, in GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019, supra, at 103 (2019); 
ERIC J. TOPOL, DEEP MEDICINE: HOW ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CAN MAKE 
HEALTHCARE HUMAN AGAIN (2019); David W. Opderbeck, Artificial Intelligence 
in Pharmaceuticals, Biologics, and Medical Devices: Present and Future 
Regulatory Models, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 553 (2019); W. Nicholson Price II, 
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of those involved in compiling the Global Innovation Index, who 
selected the future of medical innovation as the theme of their 2019 
report.55 
In addition, big data analytics have already “transformed the 
fields of biotechnology and bioinformatics while ushering in major 
advances in drug development, clinical practices, and medical 
financing.”56 With increased data value, pharmaceutical developers 
understandably will want stronger protection for their undisclosed test 
or other data. After all, the more protection they secure, the more value 
they can extract from the data and the more lead time they will have 
for such extraction.57 Moreover, the use of big data analytics in the 
pharmaceutical sector may require the provision of new incentives to 
motivate drug developers to upgrade their legacy technologies and to 
invest in new analytical tools to optimize innovation, improve clinical 
trial efficiency, and strengthen product quality, safety, and efficacy.58 
 
Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65 (2019); W. Nicholson 
Price II & Arti K. Rai, Clearing Opacity Through Machine Learning, 106 IOWA L. 
REV. 775 (2021). 
 55. GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019, supra note 54. 
 56. Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 6, at 22; see also Ryan Abbott, Big Data 
and Pharmacovigilance: Using Health Information Exchanges to Revolutionize 
Drug Safety, 99 IOWA L. REV. 225, 227 (2013) (noting that “‘big data’ is altering 
new drug development, clinical practices, and health care financing”); Sam F. 
Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem: Intellectual Property Incentives, Market 
Exclusivity, and the Future of New Medicines, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 32–34 
(2018) (discussing the use of big data and in silico screening of chemical 
compounds); Jamie Cattell et al., How Big Data Can Revolutionize Pharmaceutical 
R&D, MCKINSEY & CO. (Apr. 2013), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/ 
pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/how-big-data-can-
revolutionize-pharmaceutical-r-and-d [https://perma.cc/X3H5-7STE] (“In research 
and development … big data and analytics are being adopted across industries, 
including pharmaceuticals.”). 
 57. Extracting value from these data can be complicated, as a substantial portion 
of the value derives from the reuse, or initially unintended use, of the data. See Mark 
Burdon & Mark Andrejevic, Big Data in the Sensor Society, in BIG DATA IS NOT A 
MONOLITH 61, 69 (Cassidy R. Sugimoto et al. eds., 2016) (noting that the value in 
data “is provided by the fact that personal data can be aggregated with that of 
countless other users (and things) in order to unearth unanticipated but actionable 
research findings”); VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG 
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK AND THINK 
153 (2014) (“[I]n a big-data age, most innovative secondary uses haven’t been 
imagined when the data is first collected.”); Margaret Foster Riley, Big Data, 
HIPAA, and the Common Rule: Time for Big Change?, in BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, 
AND BIOETHICS 251, 251 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2018) (“The analysis of Big 
Data related to healthcare is often for a different purpose than the purpose for which 
the data were originally collected.”). 
 58. See W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 
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These costly investments, in turn, will generate a new cycle of 
demands for stronger data protection to help recoup the developers’ 
up-front investments.59 In responding to these demands, policymakers 
should exercise caution, as overprotection could fragment the data 
market and thereby undermine the benefits of new, innovative data 
analytical techniques.60 
C. U.S.–China Rivalry 
The final set of challenges pertains to the ongoing and ever-
growing rivalry between China and the United States. Although 
intellectual property problems in China have been the subject of a 
 
37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401 (2016) (calling for the building of infrastructure for 
transformative medical innovation to provide incentives for developing personalized 
medicine and related diagnostic tests and algorithms); Cattell et al., supra note 56 
(estimating that the application of big-data strategies “to better inform decision 
making could generate up to $100 billion in value annually across the US health-
care system, by optimizing innovation, improving the efficiency of research and 
clinical trials, and building new tools for physicians, consumers, insurers, and 
regulators to meet the promise of more individualized approaches”); Megan Nichols, 
5 Ways Big Data Is Transforming the Pharmaceutical Industry, GEEKTIME (May 8, 
2017), https://perma.cc/FJF6-SYHN (“Using Big Data and predictive analysis, 
companies can conduct effective clinical trials. The patients selected for these trials 
can meet certain prerequisites found through multiple databases, and researchers can 
monitor the participants in real-time.”). 
 59. See Nichols, supra note 58 (“Cost is one of the largest factors in the slow 
growth and acceptance of Big Data analytics in the pharmaceutical industry. It’s 
expensive to overhaul an entire infrastructure, so many companies are breaking 
changes down into small compartments in order of priority.”); Yu, Limits to TRIPS 
Harmonization, supra note 6, at 687–88 (“With … costly expenditures [in upgrading 
technology and investing in new analytical tools], one can only assume that private 
industries would want stronger protection of their proprietary data to help recoup 
those up-front investments.”). 
 60. See Josef Drexl, Designing Competitive Markets for Industrial Data: 
Between Propertisation and Access, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. 
L. 257, 260 & n.16 (2017) (considering “multiple ownership of the same data with 
considerable negative effects on access to that data” as “a situation of a ‘tragedy of 
the anti-commons’ in which too many property rights in the same asset lead to 
inefficient underuse of that asset”); Wolfgang Kerber, A New (Intellectual) Property 
Right for Non-Personal Data? An Economic Analysis, 2016 GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUR INT] 989, 990 
(positing that the introduction of new intellectual property right in data “can be … 
dangerous for innovation and competition in the digital economy, because it might 
lead to considerable legal uncertainty, the monopolisation of information, and 
impediments for the free flow of data that is so crucial for the digital economy”); 
Peter K. Yu, Data Producer’s Right and the Protection of Machine-Generated Data, 
93 TUL. L. REV. 859, 889 (2019) (noting that the fragmentation of the data market 
could “undermin[e] the benefits of new, innovative data analytical techniques”). 
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perennial debate,61 and continue to attract attention from U.S. 
policymakers,62 the fast-escalating trade war between the two 
countries has generated new tensions and conflicts that we have not 
seen since the mid-1990s.63 A few months before this Symposium, 
China and the United States threatened each other with tens or 
hundreds of billions of dollars in trade tariffs.64 As partial relief, these 
countries signed the so-called “Phase One” agreement in January 
 
 61. For the Author’s earlier discussions of the piracy and counterfeiting 
problems in China, see generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic 
Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-
PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to 
Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-first Century, 50 
AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners I]; Peter K. 
Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-
WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006); Peter K. Yu, The Middle Kingdom and 
the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 209 (2011). 
 62. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE 
INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER 
SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2018) (providing the final report of the 
Section 301 investigation on Chinese laws, policies, and practices in the areas of 
intellectual property, innovation, and technology development); OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UPDATE CONCERNING CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND 
INNOVATION (2018) (providing an update to the earlier report); Request for 
Consultations by the United States, China—Certain Measures Concerning the 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1 (Mar. 23, 2018) 
(providing the United States’ second WTO complaint against China that focused 
primarily on the violation of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 63. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 61, at 154, 170 (discussing 
the high U.S.–China tensions in the mid-1990s when the United States dispatched 
an aircraft carrier group to the Taiwan Strait following a large-scale Chinese naval 
exercise and when the United States mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade, Serbia). 
 64. See, e.g., Trump: U.S. Will Hit $300 Billion Worth of Chinese Goods with 
10% Tariff, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-
china-tariffs/trump-says-u-s-to-hit-300-billion-worth-of-chinese-goods-with-10-
tariff-idUSKCN1UR5CK [https://perma.cc/S4DW-DDZG] (announcing the 
imposition of an additional 10% tariff on $300 billion worth of Chinese imports); Se 
Young Lee & Judy Hua, China Strikes Back at U.S. with New Tariffs on $75 Billion 
in Goods, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-
china/china-strikes-back-at-us-with-new-tariffs-on-75-billion-in-goods-
idUSKCN1VD1AJ [https://perma.cc/KK6H-9FN6] (announcing the imposition of 
an additional 10% retaliatory tariffs on $75 billion worth of U.S. imports); see also 
Dorcas Wong & Alexander Chipman Koty, The US–China Trade War: A Timeline, 
CHINA BRIEFING (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-
china-trade-war-a-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/3GN3-CEJA] (providing an updated 
timeline of these tariffs). 
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2020.65 At the signing of the agreement, some trade experts already 
noted the unrealistic nature of some commitment targets.66 With the 
changing circumstances precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, it 
has become even more unlikely that the agreement will be fully 
implemented.67 
As far as pharmaceutical innovation is concerned, the rivalry 
between China and the United States is important for three reasons. 
First, China is, at present, the world’s leading supplier of active 
pharmaceutical ingredients (“APIs”).68 It also has the world’s second 
largest pharmaceutical market69 while producing about four percent of 
 
 65. Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, China–
U.S., Jan. 15, 2020, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-
taiwan/peoples-republic-china/phase-one-trade-agreement/text 
[https://perma.cc/LP3S-M3AB]. 
 66. See Jason Bordoff, Trump’s China Trade Deal Is as Dead as Can Be His 
Much-Touted Trade Victory Has Crashed and Burned with the Coronavirus 
Pandemic, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 22, 2020), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/22/trump-trade-deal-china-dead-coronavirus-
pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/G7TV-LB3C] (“The targets [for the Phase One U.S.–
China trade deal] were unrealistic even before the ink was dry in January.”); David 
Lawder & Andrea Shalal, China to Ramp up U.S. Buys Under Trade Deal, but 
Skeptics Question Targets, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china/china-to-ramp-up-u-s-buys-
under-trade-deal-but-skeptics-question-targets-idUSKBN1ZD0FN 
[https://perma.cc/5DHE-TK63] (“[S]ome U.S. trade experts call [China’s pledge to 
buy almost $80 billion of additional manufactured goods from the United States over 
the next two years] an unrealistic target ….”). 
 67. See Bordoff, supra note 66 (“Amid the collapse in oil demand and prices 
unleashed by the pandemic, it is now all but certain that China will fail to meet its 
targets for energy purchases.”); Yen Nee Lee, China’s Purchases of US Goods Will 
Fall Way Short of “Phase One” Trade Deal Due to the Coronavirus, Says Think 
Tank, CNBC (May 11, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/11/coronavirus-us-
exports-to-china-to-fall-short-of-phase-one-trade-deal-says-csis.html 
[https://perma.cc/SQ3K-AELE] (reporting the forecast of the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies that “[t]he coronavirus pandemic will cause China’s 
purchases of U.S. goods [in 2020] to fall way short of what was agreed to in the 
‘phase one’ trade deal”). 
 68. See Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective 
Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 363 (2008) (“[China] already is the world’s largest 
producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients and is likely to be a very important 
player in the generic market.”); see also WHO CHINA STUDY, supra note 36, at 17 
(“China is the world’s leading producer and exporter of [APIs] by volume, 
accounting for 20% of total global API output. China produces over 2000 API drug 
products, with annual production capacity exceeding 2 million tons.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 69. See Issaku Harada, China Extends Drug Patents to 25 Years, NIKKEI ASIAN 
REV. (May 16, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-extends-drug-patents-
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the world’s new pharmaceutical products.70 Indeed, the country’s fast-
expanding role in the global pharmaceutical landscape has sparked 
major concerns among U.S. policymakers and the American public. In 
China Rx, Rosemary Gibson and Janardan Prasad Singh warned about 
the increasing risks of the United States’ growing dependence on the 
global supply chain for pharmaceutical products and vitamins on the 
APIs originating in China.71 In the past few months, those worrying 
about the potential shortages of medicines amid the COVID-19 
pandemic also lamented the country’s continuous and increasing 
dependence on Chinese pharmaceutical products and ingredients.72 It 
is therefore no surprise that the U.S. administration—and, for that 
matter, other governments—has now actively pushed for nationalist 
policies to address the global pandemic. The next Part will discuss this 
problematic approach in greater detail.73 
Second, since the mid-2000s, China’s intellectual property 
laws and policies in the pharmaceutical sector have undergone radical 
 
to-25-years [https://perma.cc/QS2S-5Q8F] (“China’s pharmaceutical market is now 
worth more than $120 billion, second only to America’s.”). 
 70. See CHINA PHARM. ENTERS. ASS’N ET AL., FOSTERING A SUSTAINABLE 
ECOSYSTEM FOR DRUG INNOVATION IN CHINA 3 (2016), 
http://enadmin.rdpac.org/upload/upload_file/1577873373.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UE2Q-ZT4K] (“Measured by the number of pipeline drugs and 
new drugs launched, China is in the third tier, contributing around 4% to global drug 
innovations, lagging far behind the first tier[,] the US (~50%)[,] and countries in the 
second tier such as the UK and Japan.”); Ma, supra note 54, at 108 (“China has 
independently researched and developed new drugs in recent years that have 
contributed about 4% to the global novel drug market, approximately one-twelfth of 
the contribution from that of the United States of America.”). 
 71. ROSEMARY GIBSON & JANARDAN PRASAD SINGH, CHINA RX: EXPOSING THE 
RISKS OF AMERICA’S DEPENDENCE ON CHINA FOR MEDICINE (2018). 
 72. See Ana Swanson, Coronavirus Spurs U.S. Efforts to End China’s 
Chokehold on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/business/economy/coronavirus-china-trump-
drugs.html [https://perma.cc/A8BG-EHTC] (“The global spread of the coronavirus 
is reigniting efforts by the Trump administration to encourage more American 
manufacturing of pharmaceuticals and reduce dependence on China for the drugs 
and medical products that fuel the federal health care system.”); Guy Taylor, “Wake-
Up Call”: Chinese Control of U.S. Pharmaceutical Supplies Sparks Growing 
Concern, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/mar/17/china-threatens-restrict-
critical-drug-exports-us/ [https://perma.cc/FWS5-5Z2R] (“With the coronavirus 
crisis threatening to strain the U.S. government’s large stockpiles of such drugs, 
health experts warn that China’s own outbreak and related societal shutdown could 
mean major shortages ahead as Chinese factories struggle to keep up production of 
the APIs.”). 
 73. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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transformations. Although the country declined to offer patent 
protection to pharmaceutical products when it adopted the first 
modern patent law in 1984 and has remained reluctant to strengthen 
protections in the two ensuing decades,74 China took an “innovative 
turn” in the mid-2010s, shortly after its State Council adopted the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy.75 By now, it is quite clear that 
China is no longer content with being the world’s leading API supplier 
but also “wants to develop a research-based pharmaceutical 
industry.”76 
A case in point is the draft Provisional Measures for the 
Implementation of Test Data Protection for Pharmaceutical Products, 
which the National Medical Products Administration of China 
released in April 2018.77 The proposed Article 5 not only provides six 
years of protection to data submitted for the regulatory approval of 
innovative drugs (chuangxin yao)78—a TRIPS-plus standard that 
China accepted upon WTO accession79—but the provision also offers 
twelve years of protection to undisclosed test or other data for 
 
 74. See Peter K. Yu, China’s Innovative Turn and the Changing Pharmaceutical 
Landscape, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 593, 596–98 (2020) [hereinafter Yu, China’s 
Innovative Turn] (discussing China’s reluctance to strengthen patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products in the 1980s and 1990s). 
 75. See id. at 594 (“Since the mid-2000s, China has taken an innovative turn that 
has serious ramifications for the global pharmaceutical landscape and future 
developments at the intersection of intellectual property and public health.”); see 
also Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese Intellectual 
Property System, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1045, 1079–87 (2018) [hereinafter Yu, A Half-
Century of Scholarship] (discussing the State Council’s adoption of the National 
Intellectual Property Strategy and China’s innovative turn). 
 76. Yu, Limits to TRIPS Harmonization, supra note 6, at 693–94. 
 77. Provisional Measures for the Implementation of Test Data Protection for 
Pharmaceutical Products, https://chinaipr2.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/draftdata 
exclusivityrules.doc [https://perma.cc/3YFE-SURG] (China) (in Chinese) 
[hereinafter Provisional Measures]; see also Mark Cohen, Draft of Data Exclusivity 
Rules Released by CFDA, CHINA IPR (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://chinaipr.com/2018/04/26/draft-of-data-exclusivity-rules-released-by-cfda/ 
[https://perma.cc/963J-6U5E] (outlining the changes brought about by these 
provisional measures). The National Medical Products Administration of China is 
the successor to the Food and Drug Administration of China. 
 78. Provisional Measures, supra note 77, art. 5. 
 79. See World Trade Org., Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China ¶ 284, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001) (committing to the 
“introduction and enactment of laws and regulations to make sure that no person, 
other than the person who submitted such data, could, without the permission of the 
person who submitted the data, rely on such data in support of an application for 
product approval for a period of at least six years from the date on which China 
granted marketing approval to the person submitting the data”). 
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innovative therapeutic biologics (chuangxin zhiliao yong shengwu 
zhipin).80 This twelve-year standard will put China in parity with the 
United States.81 It will also be “higher than the standard laid down in 
even the most aggressive TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and 
plurilateral agreements.”82 
Finally, the recent years have seen China playing important 
roles in pushing for the greater use and development of artificial 
intelligence and machine learning in the health arena.83 As Tencent 
CEO Ma Huateng observed in the Global Innovation Index 2019 
report: 
Th[e] growth in national health expenditures is creating 
opportunities for medical AI in China. According to 
Tractica’s forecast, China’s AI medical market is 
developing rapidly, with the market size soaring from 
9.661 billion yuan in 2016, and 13.65 billion yuan in 
2017, to 20.4 billion yuan in 2018, maintaining a 
compound annual growth rate of more than 40%. At 
the same time, Chinese medical institutions and 
businesses are taking a proactive attitude towards AI. 
Nearly 80% of hospitals and medical companies are 
planning to, or already have, carried out medical AI 
applications and more than 75% of hospitals believe 
that such applications will become popular in the 
future.84 
In terms of health patent publications, the Global Innovation Index 
2019 placed China among the top three in the world in biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals, and medical technology based on publications from 
2010 to 2017.85 From 1985 to 2017, “China ranked fourth in the total 
 
 80. Provisional Measures, supra note 77, art. 5. 
 81. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2018) (providing twelve years of protection 
to undisclosed test or other data for biological products). 
 82. Yu, China’s Innovative Turn, supra note 74, at 607. 
 83. See generally LEE KAI-FU, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2018) (discussing the development relating to artificial 
intelligence in China). 
 84. Ma, supra note 54, at 103 (footnote omitted); see also Yu, Data Exclusivities, 
supra note 6, at 22 (“The introduction of big data analytics has transformed the fields 
of biotechnology and bioinformatics while ushering in major advances in drug 
development, clinical practices, and medical financing.”). 
 85. Soumitra Dutta et al., The Global Innovation Index 2019, in GLOBAL 
INNOVATION INDEX 2019, supra note 54, at 1, 48. 
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number of healthcare AI patent applications filed, contributing to 12% 
of the total.”86 In 2016, China already “surpassed Japan and the 
European Union to become the world’s second largest healthcare AI 
applicant …, which reflects the strong momentum of medical 
technology innovation in China.”87 
IV. POSSIBILITIES 
After discussing the motivations behind this Symposium, this 
Part turns to a key goal of the event and this special issue. In addition 
to taking stock of the legal developments concerning pharmaceutical 
innovation, which Parts II and III have examined, the Symposium’s 
organizing team also wants to explore new issues and models that are 
now emerging at the frontier of the debate at the intersection of 
intellectual property and public health. For this exploration, we are 
fortunate to have two highly interesting articles: one on 
biopharmaceutical standards and the other on vaccine development. 
In his article, Jorge Contreras examined the issue of patent 
disclosure in the standard-setting context,88 which is underexplored in 
the intellectual property literature. Using the case of Momenta 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,89 this 
article draws valuable lessons from the “global standards wars” and 
the more than three decades of litigation in the information and 
communication technology sector.90 The article shows that “issues 
surrounding the acquisition and disclosure of patents claiming 
standardized technologies have more salience in the biopharma sector 
than commonly believed.”91 It further calls on “standards 
organizations operating in the biopharma sector [to] ensure that their 
 
 86. Ma, supra note 54, at 104. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Jorge L. Contreras, Is Biopharma Ready for the Standards Wars?, 7 TEX. 
A&M J. PROP. L. 43, 45 (2021) [hereinafter Contreras, Standards Wars]. 
 89. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 457 F. App’x 929 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011); Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 3d 258 
(D. Mass. 2018); Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 
184 (D. Mass. 2011). 
 90. Jorge L. Contreras, The Global Standards Wars: Patent and Competition 
Disputes in North America, Europe and Asia (Univ. of Utah, S.J. Quinney Coll. of 
L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 353, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3106090 [https://perma.cc/4RZB-VV5Q]. 
 91. Contreras, Standards Wars, supra note 88, at 79. 
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policies and procedures are robust enough to delineate clearly the 
obligations of participants with respect to patents covering 
standardized technologies.”92 
The second article93 comes from Ana Santos Rutschman, who 
has written actively in the area of vaccine development long before the 
COVID-19 pandemic, covering issues relating to the Ebola, Zika, and 
other viral outbreaks.94 Her contribution to this Symposium identifies 
vaccines in two different types of markets—what she calls “happy 
markets” and “unhappy markets.”95 Given the different market 
conditions for vaccine development, she invites us to explore whether 
the rights arising out of vaccine patents can be better interpreted or 
enforced through a non-property-centric lens.96 The article 
specifically calls for the creation of “a liability regime for critical 
components of vaccine technology” to help “remove some of the most 
salient transactional obstacles to the development and 
commercialization of new and better vaccines.”97 
While these two contributions help us explore emergent issues 
and models at the frontier of the pharmaceutical innovation debate, the 
remainder of this Part will be devoted to a recent event that the 
Symposium organizers and participants did not anticipate: the 
COVID-19 pandemic.98 Issues sparked by this pandemic are not only 
timely but also relevant and important to this Symposium, for three 
 
 92. Id.  
 93. Ana Santos Rutschman, Property and Intellectual Property in Vaccine 
Markets, 7 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 110 (2021) [hereinafter Rutschman, Vaccine 
Markets]. 
 94. See GLOBAL MANAGEMENT OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE AFTER EBOLA (Sam F. 
Halabi et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter GLOBAL MANAGEMENT OF INFECTIOUS 
DISEASE] (discussing the Ebola outbreak and its aftermath); Ana Santos Rutschman, 
IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1200, 1218–43 (2018) 
(discussing the Ebola and Zika outbreaks); Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine 
Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 729, 734–50 (2019) (tracing the historical 
development of the race to develop new vaccines); Ana Santos Rutschman, Vaccine 
Licensure in the Public Interest: Lessons from the Development of the U.S. Army 
Zika Vaccine, 127 YALE L.J. F. 651 (2018) (discussing the Zika outbreak). 
 95. Rutschman, Vaccine Markets, supra note 93, at 113–18. 
 96. See id. at 130–31. 
 97. Id. at 111. 
 98. For discussions of legal issues in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, see 
generally ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 
2020); Symposium, Taming COVID-19 by Regulation, 11 EUR. J. RISK REG. 187 
(2020); Symposium, The International Legal Order and the Global Pandemic, 114 
AM. J. INT’L L. 571 (2020). 
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reasons. First, they push us to think deeper about the role of patents, 
regulatory exclusivities, and other incentive frameworks in promoting 
pharmaceutical innovation. As the proverb goes, necessity is the 
mother of invention. COVID-19 has presented an unprecedented 
opportunity to explore the possibilities both within and outside the 
intellectual property system.99 Second, the issues are relevant to the 
debate in this Symposium because they make salient the nexus 
between the domestic and international debates and between theory 
and practice in the area of pharmaceutical innovation. As we have seen 
firsthand from the ongoing development surrounding the COVID-19 
vaccines and treatments, this nexus deserves urgent scholarly and 
policy attention. Finally, issues relating to the pandemic have involved 
quite a number of participants to this Symposium. In a way, they 
provide vivid examples of intellectual property scholarship in action. 
Although the origin of SARS-CoV-2—the coronavirus that 
causes the COVID-19 disease100—remains a mystery, there is a 
general consensus that the first viral outbreak occurred in Wuhan, 
China, at the end of 2019.101 Since then, the virus spread to Europe, 
the United States, and other parts of the world in multiple directions.102 
In late January 2020, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) 
 
 99. See ANDREW T. PRICE-SMITH, CONTAGION AND CHAOS: DISEASE, ECOLOGY, 
AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 211 (2009) (“Contagion 
often proves disruptive to societies, and it is extremely problematic for governance, 
but it may result in the production of ingenuity that allows societies, economies, and 
structures of governance to switch to new modes of operation.”); E. Richard Gold, 
The Coronavirus Pandemic Has Shattered the Status Quo on Drug Development. 
We Should Build on That, FORTUNE (Mar. 26, 2020, 6:30 AM), 
https://fortune.com/2020/03/26/coronavirus-vaccine-drug-development-open-
science-covid-19-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/66DN-34Q6] (“The COVID-19 
pandemic shattered th[e] status quo [on drug development].”). 
 100. The full name of SARS-CoV-2 is “severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2.” Naming the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the Virus That 
Causes It, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-
coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-
2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it [https://perma.cc/JRC7-8XE7] (last visited Oct. 
7, 2020). 
 101. Press Release, World Health Org., Pneumonia of Unknown Cause—China 
Disease Outbreak News (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-
2020-pneumonia-of-unkown-cause-china/en/ [https://perma.cc/9CBA-N3PB]. 
 102. See WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on 
COVID-19—11 March 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-
at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020 [https://perma.cc/4R5N-
KG3B] [hereinafter WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks] (“There are now 
more than 118,000 cases in 114 countries, and 4,291 people have lost their lives.”). 
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declared COVID-19 “a public health emergency of international 
concern.”103 Two months later, on March 11, the international health 
body classified it as a global pandemic.104 To prevent the community 
spread of the coronavirus, national and sub-national governments 
throughout the world began imposing stay-home or safer-at-home 
orders, physical distancing recommendations, travel restrictions, and 
other public health measures.105 
In response to this global pandemic, international 
intergovernmental bodies quickly mobilized to coordinate efforts to 
promote access to vaccines, diagnostic kits, therapeutic treatments, 
medical devices, and other health technologies. For instance, WHO 
Director General Tedros Ghebreyesus asked “all countries, companies 
and research institutions to support open data, open science and open 
collaboration so that all people can enjoy the benefits of science and 
research.”106 Likewise, Francis Gurry, the Director General of the 
 
 103. WHO Director-General’s Statement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel 




 104. See WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks, supra note 102 (“We have 
… made the assessment that COVID-19 can be characterized as a pandemic.”); see 
also Jamie Ducharme, World Health Organization Declares COVID-19 a 
“Pandemic.” Here’s What That Means, TIME (Mar. 11, 2020, 12:39 PM), 
https://time.com/5791661/who-coronavirus-pandemic-declaration/ [https:// 
perma.cc/E2XW-CPV8]. (reporting WHO’s pandemic declaration). 
 105. See TRILATERAL STUDY, supra note 54, at 17 (“Governments around the 
globe have implemented restrictions to economic and social activities in an effort to 
slow the virus’s spread, including through policies of confinement, physical 
distancing and restrictions on travel.”). As researchers from the Center for Public 
Health Law Research at Temple University Beasley School of Law recounted in 
relation to the United States: 
On March 19, 2020, California started a trend of statewide stay-
at-home orders. Within the subsequent two weeks, 32 more states 
and the District of Columbia issued statewide stay-at-home orders 
…. [T]he remaining six states implemented stay-at-home orders 
by April 7, 2020, while Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming never issued explicit 
statewide stay-at-home orders as of July 1, 2020. 
Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the Federal, State, and Local 
Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 
98, at 10, 12. 
 106. WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on 
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World Intellectual Property Organization, issued a public statement 
noting that “emergencies and catastrophes may call for measures that 
may disrupt the normal functioning of the incentive framework upon 
which the [intellectual property] system is based.”107 In addition, the 
United Nations General Assembly issued a resolution 
[e]ncourag[ing] Member States to work in partnership 
with all relevant stakeholders to increase research and 
development funding for vaccines and medicines, 
leverage digital technologies, and strengthen scientific 
international cooperation necessary to combat COVID-
19 and to bolster coordination … towards rapid 
development, manufacturing and distribution of 
diagnostics, antiviral medicines, personal protective 
equipment and vaccines.108 
The WHO also worked closely with France, other members of the 
European Union, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to launch 
the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator, which “brings together 
governments, scientists, businesses, civil society, and philanthropists 
and global health organizations … to support[] the development and 
equitable distribution of the tests, treatments and vaccines the world 
needs to reduce mortality and severe disease.”109 
At the national level, countries quickly adopted new 
legislation, resolutions, or government decrees to increase the use of 
flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement, such as the issuance 
of compulsory licenses under Article 31110 and the utilization of the 
national security exception under Article 73.111 In March 2020, Israel 
 
 107. Francis Gurry, Some Considerations on Intellectual Property, Innovation, 
Access and COVID-19, ¶ 5, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dg_gurry/news/2020/news_0025.html 
[https://perma.cc/92K2-ZRHA]. 
 108. International Cooperation to Ensure Global Access to Medicines, Vaccines 
and Medical Equipment to Face COVID-19, ¶ 3, G.A. Res. 74/274, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/74/274 (Apr. 20, 2020). 
 109. The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator [https://perma.cc/PM4H-VBP4] 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2020). 
 110. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 31 (delineating the complex 
conditions for the use of patents without the right holder’s authorization). 
 111. See id. art. 73(b) (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed … to 
prevent a Member from taking any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests … in time of … emergency in 
international relations ….”); see also Letter from Carlos Correa, Executive Dir., S. 
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became the first country to introduce a compulsory license during the 
global pandemic.112 A few months later, the European Parliament 
adopted a nonbinding resolution “[c]alling on the [European] 
Commission and the [European Union] Member States to formally 
support the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP), allowing 
maximum sharing of COVID-19 health technology-related 
knowledge, intellectual property and data to the benefit of all countries 
and citizens.”113 Meanwhile, government agencies, private businesses, 
and not-for-profit organizations launched proactive initiatives to 
facilitate domestic and international cooperation, ranging from the 
issuance of open licenses114 to the release of COVID-19 Open 
Research Dataset115 to public pledges of patented technologies and 
other intellectual properties.116 
In academic and policy circles, commentators advanced 
innovative proposals to help governments and intergovernmental 
 
Ctr., to Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir.-Gen. of the World Health Org., Francis 
Gurry, Dir.-Gen. of the World Intellectual Property Org., and Roberto Azevêdo, 
Dir.-Gen. of the World Trade Org. (Apr. 4, 2020) (“The use of [Article 73] will be 
fully justified to procure medical products and devices or to use the technologies to 
manufacture them as necessary to address the current health emergency.”); Frederick 
Abbott, The TRIPS Agreement Article 73 Security Exceptions and the COVID-19 
Pandemic (S. Ctr., Rsch. Paper No. 116, 2020) (discussing the use of Article 73 in 
the COVID-19 context). 
 112. See Adam Houldsworth, The Key Covid-19 Compulsory Licensing 
Developments So Far, IAM (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.iam-
media.com/coronavirus/the-key-covid-19-compulsory-licensing-developments-so-
far [https://perma.cc/S2L8-PVLJ] (“The only country in which a Covid-19-related 
compulsory licence has been granted so far is Israel.”). This license sought to import 
a generic version of AbbVie’s Kaletra (lopinavir/ritonavir) from India for treating 
COVID-19 patients. Id. 
 113. European Parliament Resolution on the EU’s Public Health Strategy Post-
COVID-19, art. 6, 2020/2691(RSP) (July 10, 2020). 
 114. See Publishers Make Coronavirus (COVID-19) Content Freely Available 
and Reusable, WELLCOME (Mar. 16, 2020), https://wellcome.ac.uk/press-
release/publishers-make-coronavirus-covid-19-content-freely-available-and-
reusable (stating that leading publishers made coronavirus-related works freely 
available). 
 115. See Press Release, White House Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol’y, Call to Action to 
the Tech Community on New Machine Readable COVID-19 Dataset (Mar. 16, 
2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/call-action-tech-
community-new-machine-readable-covid-19-dataset/ [https://perma.cc/GW8S-
Q8WJ] (announcing the joint effort of the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, the Allen Institute for AI, the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, 
Georgetown University, Microsoft, and the National Institutes of Health to release 
the COVID-19 Open Research Dataset). 
 116. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 150–154 (discussing the Open 
COVID pledge). 
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bodies to reduce the barriers that the intellectual property system may 
pose to efforts addressing the global pandemic. For example, 
Frederick Abbott and Jerome Reichman proposed legal measures on 
both the supply and demand sides to promote the “equitable access to 
vaccines, treatments, diagnostics and medical equipment.”117 Teresa 
Hackett underscored the important roles played by text and data 
mining and the right to research during the global pandemic.118 Yaniv 
Heled, Ana Santos Rutschman, and Liza Vertinsky called for 
intellectual property law to incorporate the tort law privileges of self-
defense and necessity.119 Joshua Sarnoff advocated the development 
of a more robust legal right to repair and produce the needed medical 
equipment, spare parts, and products in emergencies.120 
While most of these developments have been promising and 
have greatly enhanced domestic and international cooperation, some 
countries took a different route and opted instead for nationalist 
pandemic responses. Their choices have raised concerns throughout 
the world, especially among developing countries. For instance, the 
Trump Administration has been widely criticized for banning the 
export of personal protective equipment to other countries, including 
those that were struggling with similar public health crises.121 The 
 
 117. Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, Facilitating Access to Cross-
Border Supplies of Patented Pharmaceuticals: The Case of the COVID-19 
Pandemic, 23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 535 (2020). 
 118. Teresa Hackett, COVID and Copyright: The Right to Research, ELEC. INFO. 
FOR LIBR. (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.eifl.net/blogs/covid-and-copyright-right-
research [https://perma.cc/C48A-BP9V]. 
 119. Yaniv Heled et al., The Need for the Tort Law Privileges of Self-Defense and 
Necessity in Intellectual Property Law (July 3, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3642833 [https://perma.cc/K7WA-J984]. 
 120. Joshua D. Sarnoff, TRIPS, COVID-19, and the Right to Repair and Produce 
Needed Medical Products in Emergencies (Part 1 of 2), TRADERX REPORT (June 
11, 2020), https://www.traderxreport.com/covid-19/trips-covid-19-and-the-right-to-
repair-and-produce-needed-medical-products-in-emergencies-part-1-of-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/M9M8-TLQ6]; Joshua D. Sarnoff, TRIPS, COVID-19 and the 
Right to Repair and Produce Needed Medical Products in Emergencies (Part 2 of 
2), TRADERX REPORT, (June 11, 2020), https://www.traderxreport.com/covid-
19/trips-covid-19-and-the-right-to-repair-and-produce-needed-medical-products-
in-emergencies-part-2-of-2/ [https://perma.cc/J36E-UCND]. 
 121. See Ana Swanson et al., Trump Seeks to Block 3M Mask Exports and Grab 
Masks from Its Overseas Customers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-3m-
masks.html [https://perma.cc/53W5-H3JN] (reporting that “the administration is 
invoking the [Defense Production Act] to compel 3M to send to the United States 
masks made in factories overseas and to stop exporting masks the company 
manufactures in the United States”). 
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administration also has embraced a “go it alone” approach to 
developing COVID-19 vaccines and treatments.122 Not only did 
President Trump refuse to join other world leaders “in a virtual 
summit … to pledge billions of dollars to quickly develop vaccines 
and drugs to fight the coronavirus,”123 but the United States also 
declined to participate in the COVAX Initiative, which aims to 
provide fair and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines throughout 
the world and which will be further discussed below.124 
Although the Trump administration’s highly controversial 
instruction of 3M and other companies not to export personal 
protective equipment has received wide media coverage,125 the United 
States is not the only country that has taken a nationalist stand during 
the global pandemic. According to the Global Trade Alert project at 
 
 122. As a Congressional Research Service report declared: 
In May 2020, the Trump Administration announced the creation 
of a program called Operation Warp Speed, which seeks to use 
coordinated government support to accelerate the development, 
manufacturing, and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and other 
medical countermeasures. With respect to vaccines, the program 
initially selected fourteen promising candidates, which are being 
narrowed down to “about seven.” Under Operation Warp Speed, 
the federal government is investing in scaling up manufacturing 
and distribution for selected COVID-19 vaccine candidates “at 
risk” (that is, before safety and efficacy is demonstrated). Under 
the program, [the Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority] has entered into agreements to accelerate 
the development and manufacturing—and to purchase hundreds 
of millions of doses—for vaccine candidates being developed by 
AstraZeneca and the University of Oxford, Sanofi and 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), Pfizer and BioNTech, Moderna and 
NIAID, Novavax, and Johnson & Johnson. By November 2020, 
three of the manufacturers participating in Operation Warp 
Speed—Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna/NIAID, and 
AstraZeneca/University of Oxford—announced encouraging 
safety and efficacy results from the Phase 3 trials of their vaccines. 
KEVIN J. HICKEY & ERIN H. WARD, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46399, LEGAL ISSUES IN 
COVID-19 VACCINE DEVELOPMENT 1, 1–2 (2020) (footnotes omitted). 
 123. William Booth et al., U.S. Skips Virtual Vaccine Summit as World Leaders 
Pledge Billions to Efforts, WASH. POST, May 5, 2020, at A1. 
 124. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 155–163 (discussing the 
COVAX Initiative). 
 125. See Anya van Wagtendonk, A White House Order to Keep Masks in the US 
Could Limit Supply, Companies Warn, VOX (Apr. 4, 2020), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/4/4/21208142/coronavirus-ppe-
exports-masks-dpa-trump-administration-3m [https://perma.cc/G3D8-DM9P] 
(warning that the Trump administration’s policy limiting personal protective 
equipment exports could backfire on the administration). 
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the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland, “[a]t least 69 countries 
have banned or restricted the export of protective equipment, medical 
devices or medicines.”126 
As society continues to move forward with the development 
and procurement of COVID-19 vaccines, policymakers and 
commentators have become particularly worried about what they have 
called “vaccine nationalism”127 or “pharmaceutical sovereignty.”128 
From a public health standpoint, the adoption of nationalist policy 
responses to address the global pandemic, while unsurprising, can be 
highly dangerous because it will prevent the much-needed 
international cooperation in the ongoing search for vaccines, 
treatments, and cures as well as the continuous effort to “contain, 
mitigate and defeat the pandemic.”129 As Kathryn White and Maria 
 
 126. Peter S. Goodman et al., A New Front for Nationalism: The Global Battle 
Against a Virus, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/business/coronavirus-vaccine-
nationalism.html [https://perma.cc/6ZY6-BSQJ]. 
 127. See, e.g., Thomas J. Bollyky & Chad P. Bown, The Tragedy of Vaccine 
Nationalism Only Cooperation Can End the Pandemic, FOREIGN AFFS. (Sept./Oct. 
2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-07-27/vaccine-
nationalism-pandemic [https://perma.cc/F826-YC8K]; Ian Bremmer, What Vaccine 
Nationalism Means for the Coronavirus, TIME (July 27, 2020), 
https://time.com/5871532/vaccine-nationalism-coronavirus-pandemic/ 
[https://perma.cc/7ELZ-D5PL]; Kate Kelland & Julie Steenhuysen, “Vaccine 
Nationalism”: Is It Every Country For Itself?, REUTERS (July 29, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-vaccines-access-an/vaccine-
nationalism-is-it-every-country-for-itself-idUSKCN24U2DE 
[https://perma.cc/T78W-TXKZ]; Kai Kupferschmidt, “Vaccine Nationalism” 
Threatens Global Plan to Distribute COVID-19 Shots Fairly, SCI. (July 28, 2020), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/07/vaccine-nationalism-threatens-global-
plan-distribute-covid-19-shots-fairly [https://perma.cc/J8G5-NRE7]; Richard Milne 
& David Crow, Why Vaccine “Nationalism” Could Slow Coronavirus Fight, FIN. 
TIMES (May 13 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/6d542894-6483-446c-87b0-
96c65e89bb2c [https://perma.cc/U4X9-EAVB]; Rebecca Weintraub et al., The 
Danger of Vaccine Nationalism, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 22, 2020), 
https://hbr.org/2020/05/the-danger-of-vaccine-nationalism 
[https://perma.cc/ZN5R-JQ79]. 
 128. Germán Velásquez, Re-thinking Global and Local Manufacturing of 
Medical Products After COVID-19, at 3 (S. Ctr., Rsch. Paper No. 118, 2020). 
 129. See Global Solidarity to Fight the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), 
¶ 5, G.A. Res. 74/270, U.N. Doc. A/RES/74/270 (Apr. 2, 2020) (calling for 
“intensified international cooperation to contain, mitigate and defeat the pandemic, 
including by exchanging information, scientific knowledge and best practices and 
by applying the relevant guidelines recommended by the World Health 
Organization”). 
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Banda observed in relation to the outbreak of the H1N1 influenza,130 
an earlier WHO-declared pandemic: 
National pandemic preparedness, by its nature, is an 
international issue: in a world lacking equitable access 
to the cure, even the vaccinated would face devastation 
if the global economy were to stop in its tracks. Instead 
of hoarding the vaccine, the West ought to release it to 
the most vulnerable, because the regions the first to be 
hit would also be the first line of defence.131 
Because many countries that are breeding grounds for viral outbreaks 
also struggle with poverty and infrastructure problems,132 they need as 
much international assistance as they can secure. The United States 
and other developed and emerging countries should therefore provide 
assistance while actively engaging in greater international 
cooperation. These countries should do so not only out of altruism but 
also because of the domestic need to protect national health 
security.133 
 
 130. See generally SARA ELLEN DAVIES ET AL., DISEASE DIPLOMACY: 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 74–92 (2015) (discussing 
the H1N1 pandemic). 
 131. Kathryn White & Maria Banda, The Role of Civil Society in Pandemic 
Preparedness, in INNOVATION IN GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 105, 118 (Andrew 
F. Cooper & John J. Kirton eds., 2009); see also SARA E. DAVIES, GLOBAL POLITICS 
OF HEALTH 140 (2012) (“The first line of defence is ‘prevention, treatment and 
control programs’ before the disease reached US shores.” (quoting a USAID 
document)). 
 132. See Anthony S. Fauci, The Ebola Epidemic of 2014–2015: A Perfect Storm, 
in GLOBAL MANAGEMENT OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE, supra note 94, at 21, 25 (“The 
Ebola outbreak of 2014–2015 originated in severely under-resourced countries with 
limited public health infrastructure and no prior experience controlling Ebola.”); 
Colin McInnes, The Many Meanings of Health Security, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK 
OF GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 7, 10 (Simon Rushton & Jeremy Youde eds., 2015) 
(“[Those states that] have had very high levels of infection for more than a decade, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa[,] … are … among some of the poorest countries 
on earth.”); Morten Broberg, A Critical Appraisal of the World Health 
Organization’s International Health Regulations (2005) in Times of Pandemic: It Is 
Time for Revision, 11 EUR. J. RISK REG. 202, 208 (2020) (“[B]ecause states in the 
Global South, on average, have fewer resources to enable them to detect and respond 
to transmittable diseases at an early stage, there is a higher risk that if such diseases 
do break out, they may quickly become unmanageable in these country contexts.”); 
Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 15, at 1652 (“[P]overty and a lack of 
infrastructure—whether in Asia, Africa, or other parts of the world—could create 
‘weak links’ in the global response to pandemics.”). 
 133. As my colleagues at the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs noted in 
their 2017 White Paper: 
The problem of insufficient infrastructure is a global problem with 
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As dangerous as they can be, nationalist pandemic responses 
are also highly ineffective. Because global pandemics do not respect 
territorial borders,134 nationalist approaches rarely provide effective 
policy responses. As the webpage for the Access to COVID-19 Tools 
Accelerator rightly reminded us, “[n]o-one is safe until everyone is 
safe.”135 The need for international cooperation to promote domestic 
and global health security therefore cannot be overlooked. 
 
implications for our homeland security. If localized outbreaks 
become regional epidemics and/or global pandemics because 
laboratories, clinics, and hospitals in developing nations do not 
have the ability to rapidly detect and control outbreaks, then the 
devastation caused by high-impact infectious diseases will enter 
the United States, where we would face our own surge capacity 
struggles. 
SCOWCROFT INST. OF INT’L AFFS., TEXAS A&M UNIV., THE GROWING THREAT OF 
PANDEMICS: ENHANCING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY 31 (2017); 
see also SIMON RUSHTON, SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH: PANDEMICS AND 
POLITICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 37–38 (2019) (“The weakness of health 
systems in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone led to what should have been at worst 
a localized epidemic becoming a regional problem, with … the potential to transform 
into a global pandemic.”); Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 15, at 1630 (calling for 
intellectual property negotiators to “realign their focus … [away from] trade benefits 
… [and] with greater security benefits within the global health system”). 
 134. As Colin McInnes observed: 
Health threats, the provision of health care services and the market 
for pharmaceuticals are increasingly transborder in nature. In 
terms of health security, this makes defence “at the border” a near 
impossibility despite efforts by states to do just that. The state can 
no longer function as a self-contained vessel for health provision 
(and indeed health security), rather it has become permeable. This 
is most obliviously the case with infectious disease where the 
processes of globalization have enabled disease to spread more 
quickly. 
Colin McInnes, National Security and Global Health Governance, in GLOBAL 
HEALTH GOVERNANCE: CRISIS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 42, 44 
(Adrian Kay & Owain David Williams eds., 2009) (citation omitted); see also 
OBIJIOFOR AGINAM, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH IN A DIVIDED WORLD 6 (2005) (“Microbes carry no national 
passports, neither do they recognize geo-political boundaries or state sovereignty.”); 
DAVID P. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE 13–
16 (2004) (discussing the “germs do not recognize borders” mantra of public health); 
MARK W. ZACHER & TANIA J. KEEFE, THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL HEALTH 
GOVERNANCE: UNITED BY CONTAGION 1 (2008) (“The world is becoming an ever 
smaller place, and microbes that cause devastating diseases do not stop for border 
guards.”). 
 135. World Health Org., The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, 
https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator [https://perma.cc/6JPU-KUP4] (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2020). 
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To some extent, policymakers and governments seem to be 
struck with a national pandemic response paradox:136 while 
policymakers and governments know full well that global pandemics 
will necessitate cross-border solutions, the national public health 
crises steer their time, efforts, and energies toward developing policies 
to protect domestic constituents.137 In this paradoxical policy 
environment, one logically wonders whether we could develop new 
models to better utilize the intellectual property system to address the 
global pandemic. One may also be curious about what global actions 
countries could take to enhance policy flexibilities and to more 
effectively address the highly diverse national and sub-national 
challenges posed by the global pandemic. 
Although this Part does not have room to engage in a more 
extended discussion of the various international, national, and sub-
national pandemic responses, some interesting models have emerged 
 
 136. Other commentators have identified similar paradoxes. For example, John 
Kraemer and Mark Siedner observed: 
A central paradox of the West African Ebola epidemic is that, 
eventually, high-income countries and international 
organizations—especially the governments of the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, as well as the World 
Bank—expended enormous resources to control the epidemic…. 
[T]hose same resources are rarely made available to prevent 
epidemics, even though they would likely be more cost-effectively 
deployed then and could avert greater mortality. 
John D. Kraemer & Mark J. Siedner, The Effect of Ebola Virus Disease on Health 
Outcomes and Systems in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, in GLOBAL 
MANAGEMENT OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE, supra note 94, at 55, 67 (footnote omitted); 
see also Peter G. Danchin et al., The Pandemic Paradox in International Law, 114 
AM. J. INT’L L. 598, 599 (2020) (defining the “pandemic paradox” as “the fact that 
the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the inherent logic and necessity of an effective 
international legal order at a moment when ideas of supranational organization and 
post-national sovereignty are increasingly resisted”); Mohamed S. El-Zomor & 
Amin R. Yacoub, The Paradoxical Effect of COVID-19 on Globalisation, OXPOL 
(Apr. 27, 2020), https://blog.politics.ox.ac.uk/the-paradoxical-effect-of-covid-19-
on-globalization/ [https://perma.cc/TDJ7-DQWV] (arguing that the COVID-19 
pandemic “will set the stage for a potentially unprecedented era of global 
cooperation” despite having the tendency to intensify nationalism). 
 137. See RUSHTON, supra note 133, at 1 (“Because of politics, governments fail 
to cooperate internationally to prevent, detect and control outbreaks.”); see also 
JEREMY YOUDE, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 141 (2012) (“Securitization … 
promotes short-term, us-versus-them thinking.”); Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 
15, at 1569 (noting the disconnect between the domestic and international debates 
on intellectual property and public health and the failure on the part of U.S. Congress 
and administration to synchronize domestic laws and policies with global 
developments). 
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in the past year. To illustrate the wide array of policy options and 
possibilities both within and outside the intellectual property system, 
this Part focuses on three widely praised initiatives. 
In March 2020, Costa Rica advanced a proposal to create a 
patent pool of “technologies that are useful for the detection, 
prevention, control and treatment of the COVID-19 pandemic.”138 
Building on the model that the Medicines Patent Pool utilizes139 but 
going beyond its focus on patents and essential medicines,140 the 
proposal stated: 
 
This pool, which will involve voluntary assignments, 
should include existing and future rights in patented 
inventions and designs, as well rights in regulatory test 
data, knowhow, cell lines, copyrights and blueprints 
for manufacturing diagnostic tests, devices, drugs, or 
vaccines. It should provide for free access or licensing 
on reasonable and affordable terms, in every member 
country.141 
As part of its Solidarity Call to Action,142 the WHO embraced and 
operationalized Costa Rica’s proposal and formally named it the 
 
 138. Letter from Carlos Alvarado Quesada, President of Costa Rica, to Tedros 
Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org. (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/President-MoH-Costa-Rica-Dr-
Tedros-WHO24March2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RUT-6VAV] [hereinafter Costa 
Rica Proposal]. 
 139. Established in July 2010 as a spinoff from Unitaid, a global health initiative 
financed by levies on plane tickets, the Medicines Patent Pool “aim[s] to increase 
access to, and facilitate the development of, life-saving medicines for low- and 
middle-income countries through an innovative approach to voluntary licensing and 
patent pooling.” About Us, MEDICINES PATENT POOL, 
https://medicinespatentpool.org/who-we-are/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/RH49-
X58X] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020). 
 140. See William Worley, COVID-19 Puts a Spotlight on the Medicines Patent 
Pool, DEVEX (June 22, 2020), https://www.devex.com/news/covid-19-puts-a-
spotlight-on-the-medicines-patent-pool-97461 [https://perma.cc/KX82-S6BB] 
(“MPP [Medicines Patent Pool] … has been [pooling technology] for a decade with 
patents, although not with other types of intellectual property that C-TAP plans to 
share, such as regulatory data. While there is not yet widespread agreement on how 
to make tools for beating COVID-19 accessible, MPP’s mandate has already been 
expanded to cover the illness.”); see also TRILATERAL STUDY, supra note 54, at 12 
(“[W]ith the support of WHO and Unitaid, the Medicines Patent Pool has 
temporarily expanded its mandate to cover any COVID-19-related health 
technologies, including vaccines and diagnostics.”). 
 141. Costa Rica Proposal, supra note 138. 
 142. See Making the Response to COVID-19 a Public Common Good: Solidarity 
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COVID-19 Technology Access Pool.143 Known for its abbreviation C-
TAP, this technology pool is important because the technologies 
needed to address the global pandemic will likely involve multiple 
patent owners.144 The pooling arrangement will therefore help prevent 
what commentators have called “patent thickets”145 or “the tragedy of 
 
Call to Action, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 1, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-
research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/covid-19-technology-access-
pool/solidarity-call-to-action [https://perma.cc/WWU8-7LLY] (requesting “key 
stakeholders and the global community to voluntarily pool knowledge, intellectual 
property and data necessary for COVID-19”). 
 143. See COVID-19 Technology Access Pool, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-
research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/covid-19-technology-access-pool 
[https://perma.cc/EE8M-7MGL] (last visited Aug. 23, 2020) (“[C-TAP] compile[s], 
in one place, pledges of commitment made under the Solidarity Call to Action to 
voluntarily share COVID-19 health technology related knowledge, intellectual 
property and data.”); see also WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the 
Media Briefing on COVID-19—29 May 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 29, 
2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-
remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---29-may-2020 
[https://perma.cc/9SZV-3N7P] (identifying the five priorities of C-TAP). 
 144. As researchers from the Erasmus University Medical Center in the 
Netherlands surmised in relation to the patent pool proposal during the outbreak of 
the SARS coronavirus: 
[In the absence of a patent pool, i]t is likely that patent rights 
incorporating the SARS genomic sequence will be fragmented 
across several groups. Sorting out these rights will be complex and 
may require intervention of the law court…. [For firms 
considering whether to develop a SARS vaccine], uncertainty over 
patent rights makes this decision even more difficult, because it is 
neither possible to determine the future cost of licensing the patent 
rights, nor whether all necessary patents will be available for 
licensing…. The incentive for vaccine manufacturers is therefore 
to delay the decision to invest. 
H.M. Simon et al., Managing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
Intellectual Property Rights: The Possible Role of Patent Pooling, 83 BULL. WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 707, 708 (2005). 
 145. See ELLEN F.M. ‘T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
MONOPOLY POWER: DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE APPLICATION 
OF THE WTO DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 90 (2009) 
(“Potential benefits of pooling include: a) reduced licensing transaction costs 
through ‘one stop’ licensing rather than multiple agreements; b) elimination of 
blocking patents; c) management of multiple owners and stacking of royalties ….”); 
Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 15, at 1600 (“[P]atent pools provide an efficient 
and effective solution when patent rights are highly fragmented.”). Carl Shapiro 
defined a patent thicket as “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights 
that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new 
technology.” Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent 
Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 
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the anti-commons.”146 The pool will further promote the research and 
innovation needed to address the global pandemic.147 At the 
international level, the pool will also help promote the transfer of 
technology from developed to developing countries148 while 
facilitating the greater integration of complementary technologies.149 
A month later, an international coalition of legal experts, 
scientists, and technologists released the Open COVID Pledge, which 
“calls on organizations around the world to make their patents and 
copyrights freely available in the fight against the COVID-19 
pandemic.”150 Among the masterminds behind this initiative is Jorge 
 
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001). 
 146. Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg defined the “the tragedy of the anti-
commons” as a situation in which “multiple owners each have a right to exclude 
others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use.” Michael 
A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998); see also MICHAEL 
HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS 
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 49–78 (2010) (discussing the 
tragedy of the anti-commons in the biomedical research area). 
 147. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. 
HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 53 (2006) (“Patent pools of upstream technologies may be useful 
in some circumstances to promote innovation relevant to developing countries.”); 
see also Dianne Nicol & Jane Nielsen, Opening the Dam: Patent Pools, Innovation 
and Access to Essential Medicines, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: 
PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 235, 238 (Thomas Pogge et al. 
eds., 2010) [hereinafter INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH] (“Patent pooling 
may … hold promise at the upstream discovery phase of the innovation cycle.”). 
 148. See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT & GRAHAM DUKES, GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL 
POLICY: ENSURING MEDICINES FOR TOMORROW’S WORLD 39 (2011) (“Patent pools 
are sufficiently common as to have become subject to a fairly sophisticated level of 
regulation, for example, in the European Commission guidelines on technology 
transfer. Many of the issues surrounding the negotiation and implementation of 
patent pools already are anticipated by competition authorities.”); ‘T HOEN, supra 
note 145, at 90 (pointing out that these pools have the potential to both “encompass 
non-patent technology and know-how” and “facilitate technology transfer and a 
sustainable scaling-up of capacity and access in the developing world”). 
 149. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES 
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5 (1995) (“[Patent pools] may 
provide procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies ….”). 
But see Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 147, at 237 (“[Patent pools] could be both anti-
competitive, particularly if they encourage collusion and shield weak patents, and 
anti-innovative (or innovation-neutral), particularly if they don’t include all 
necessary patents or are poorly managed and inadequately resourced.”). 
 150. OPEN COVID PLEDGE, https://opencovidpledge.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/7AQP-UP6P] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020). For discussions of 
patent pledges, see generally PATENT PLEDGES (Jorge Contreras & Meredith Jacob 
eds., 2017); Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543 (2015). 
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Contreras, a contributor to this special issue. Since its creation, the 
Open COVID Pledge has attracted the support of Amazon, AT&T, 
Facebook, Fujitsu, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, 
Mitsubishi, Uber, and other leading patent holders.151 At the time of 
writing, this timely pledge has already covered the following 
intellectual properties: 
3D-printed respirators, touch screens that use 
ultraviolet light to prevent the spread of infection, a 
Wi-Fi enabled floating hospital, methods for designing 
grocery stores to ensure social distancing, a low-cost, 
single-use ventilator, software for accelerating disease 
diagnosis, algorithms for routing emergency vehicles 
through traffic, [and] a drive-up booth for Covid-19 
testing.152 
This Open COVID Pledge built on the tireless efforts that 
policymakers, commentators, and activists have undertaken in the past 
two decades to show why open innovation can be highly beneficial in 
the public health arena, especially in relation to vaccine and drug 
development.153 This pledge will greatly enhance the cooperation and 
collaboration among individuals, businesses, not-for-profit 
organizations, and government and intergovernmental agencies 
throughout the world. As Henry Chesbrough reminded us: 
Opening up mobilizes knowledge from many different 
places, causing our learning to advance and our 
progress against the disease to accelerate. Openness 
unleashes a volunteer army of researchers, working in 
 
 151. Pledgors, OPEN COVID PLEDGE, https://opencovidpledge.org/partners/ 
[https://perma.cc/V25S-6HWY] (last visited Sept. 12, 2020). 
 152. Jorge Contreras, Putting Pledged IP to Work—Identifying IP Available 
Under the Open COVID Pledge, OPEN COVID PLEDGE (June 12, 2020), 
https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/06/12/putting-pledged-ip-to-work-identifying-
ip-available-under-the-open-covid-pledge/ [https://perma.cc/AMK4-VHNA]. 
 153. For discussions of open innovation in the pharmaceutical context, see 
generally GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT 
POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES 169–
244 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009); Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Open Source Drug 
Discovery: A Revolutionary Paradigm or a Utopian Model?, in INCENTIVES FOR 
GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 147, at 263; Amy Kapczynski, Order Without 
Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539 
(2017); Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open 
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 
(2005). 
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their own facilities, across different time zones, and 
different countries. Openness leverages the human 
capital available in the world to tackle the disease, and 
also accesses the physical capital (such as plant and 
equipment) already in place to launch rapid testing of 
possible solutions. 
…. 
Open innovation can help speed things up. The 
availability of the gene sequencing of the coronavirus 
establishes a clear target to all of us. The 50+ vaccine 
candidates being considered are all already-approved 
drugs for other medical uses. This means that each 
candidate’s basic safety dosage levels in humans have 
already been established. This allows the testing to start 
in the middle of the usual drug development process, 
with the Phase 1 safety protocols already completed. 
Releasing all the relevant medical research at once, in 
a machine-readable form that allows rapid absorption 
of the science, to anyone who wants to look at it, allows 
researchers from all over the world to contribute. And 
not just professional researchers and scientists, but also 
amateur researchers who have a passion and a hunch to 
test.154 
Finally, toward the end of April 2020, the WHO worked with 
Gavi and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations to 
launch the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (“COVAX”) 
Initiative.155 This initiative aims to “accelerate the development and 
manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines … and to guarantee fair and 
equitable access for every country in the world.”156 The initiative’s 
 
 154. Henry Chesbrough, To Recover Faster from Covid-19, Open Up: 
Managerial Implications from an Open Innovation Perspective, 88 INDUS. 
MARKETING MGMT. 410, 410–11 (2020); see also U.N. Sec’y-Gen.’s High-Level 
Panel on Access to Medicines, supra note 10, at 27 (“Open models of innovation, 
which are generally patent free and often rely on quick, straightforward licensing, 
… [are] especially important to lower the hurdles of entry and accelerate the pace of 
development of health technologies, including those needed to combat emergent 
diseases.”). 
 155. COVAX: Working for Global Equitable Access to COVID-19 Vaccines, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax 
[https://perma.cc/L6QD-R5D3] (last visited Aug. 18, 2020). 
 156. Id. 
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current target is to create two billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines that 
will be equitably distributed among the participating countries.157 By 
July 2020, seventy-five countries had expressed interest in joining the 
COVAX Facility and “financ[ing] the vaccines from their own public 
finance budgets.”158 The initiative will further allow these countries to 
“partner with up to 90 lower-income countries that could be supported 
through voluntary donations to Gavi’s COVAX Advance Market 
Commitment.”159 As this special issue goes to print, the United States, 
under the new Biden Administration, has just announced its plan to 
join the COVAX Facility.160 
The launch of this global development and procurement 
initiative is badly needed as the world currently does not have the 
necessary capacity to manufacture vaccines for the entire global 
population.161 As South Africa rightly acknowledged in its general 
 
 157. See COVAX Explained, GAVI (Sept. 3, 2020), 
https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-explained [https://perma.cc/2LNR-
T8M3] (“All participating countries, regardless of income levels, will have equal 
access to these vaccines once they are developed. The initial aim is to have 2 billion 
doses available by the end of 2021, which should be enough to protect high risk and 
vulnerable people, as well as frontline healthcare workers.”). 
 158. Press Release, World Health Org., More Than 150 Countries Engaged in 




 159. Id. 
 160. See Stephanie Nebehay, U.S., Staying in WHO, to Join COVID Vaccine Push 
for Poor Nations: Fauci, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2021, 3:38 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-who-usa/u-s-staying-in-
who-to-join-covid-vaccine-push-for-poor-nations-fauci-idUSKBN29Q12B 
[https://perma.cc/6JLQ-VK47] (providing a list of countries participating in the 
COVAX Initiative). 
 161. As a Lancet editorial noted: 
To protect the global population, 6.2 billion doses of pandemic 
vaccine will be needed, but under current manufacturing capacity 
the world can only produce 500 million doses. And, in a pandemic, 
it is industrialised countries that will have access to available 
vaccines, whereas developing countries—where a pandemic is 
likely to emerge—will be left wanting. In November, 2004, a 
WHO consultation reached the depressing conclusion that most 
developing countries would have no access to vaccine during the 
first wave of a pandemic and possibly throughout its duration. 
Editorial, Global Solidarity Needed in Preparing for Pandemic Influenza, 369 
LANCET 532, 532 (2007) [hereinafter Global Solidarity Needed]; see also PEOPLE’S 
HEALTH MOVEMENT ET AL., GLOBAL HEALTH WATCH 2: AN ALTERNATIVE WORLD 
HEALTH REPORT 233 (2008) (“As drug companies can produce only a limited 
amount of vaccines in a given year, many developed countries have made advance 
  
38 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
statement in the July 2020 meeting of the Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights at the WTO: 
The challenge before us is to produce an effective 
vaccine to meet the needs of the world population of 
7.8 billion in as short a time frame as possible. This will 
require the sharing of knowledge and technology of 
successful vaccines so that the widest distribution at 
lowest cost can be achieved.162 
Even with its targeted two billion doses, the COVAX Initiative 
provides only a quarter of the vaccines needed for the entire global 
population. That number will be significantly lowered by a factor of 
multiples if the vaccine requires timed or regular boosters to create 
immunity.163 
The problem concerning global vaccine shortage is nothing 
new. For developing countries, it was a major issue during the H1N1 
pandemic164 as well as the earlier H5N1 avian influenza outbreak.165 
Indeed, the concerns about such shortage were so acute that Indonesia, 
 
purchase orders for vaccines, limiting even further the prospects of countries like 
Indonesia benefiting from vaccine development.” (citation omitted)). 
 162. Nirmalya Syam, WTO TRIPS Council Discusses National IP Measures and 
TRIPS Flexibilities in the Context of COVID-19 (S. Ctr., SouthNews No. 327, Aug. 
7, 2020), https://us5.campaign-
archive.com/?u=fa9cf38799136b5660f367ba6&id=184960e08b 
[https://perma.cc/X9Q2-HQD6]; see also Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting—Held in the Centre William 
Rappard on 30 July 2020, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/95/Add.1 (Oct. 2, 2020) (providing 
the minutes of the July 2020 meeting). 
 163. See Sarah Pitt, A Coronavirus Vaccine May Require Boosters—Here’s What 
That Means, CONVERSATION (July 29, 2020), https://theconversation.com/a-
coronavirus-vaccine-may-require-boosters-heres-what-that-means-143370 
[https://perma.cc/83AA-B28W] (“[I]t currently seems likely that most potential 
vaccines designed to protect against the SARS-CoV-2 virus that causes COVID-19 
will require boosters, perhaps regularly.”); Kevin Rawlinson, More Data Needed 
Before Giving Just One Vaccine Dose, Says Covid Adviser, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 
2020 12:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/23/more-data-
needed-before-second-vaccine-dose-diverted-to-first-timers-says-covid-adviser 
[https://perma.cc/ED3E-LDMC] (reporting the emerging debate on the sufficiency 
of a single, as opposed to double, dose of the currently approved vaccine). 
 164. See David P. Fidler, Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza Vaccines: 
Global Health Diplomacy and the Controversies Surrounding Avian Influenza 
H5N1 and Pandemic Influenza H1N1, 7 PLOS MED. e1000247, at 1 (2010) 
(“Developed countries placed large advance orders for 2009-H1N1 vaccine and 
bought virtually all the vaccine companies could manufacture.”). 
 165. See Global Solidarity Needed, supra note 161 (expressing sympathy to the 
developing countries’ concern at the time of the H5N1 avian influenza outbreak 
about their lack of adequate and affordable access to pandemic vaccines). 
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India, Thailand, and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement166 
began asserting highly controversial claims of “viral sovereignty” to 
protect the virus samples they had collected from patients or animals 
on their soils.167 Their wish to protect their own nationals and residents 
is no different from those policymakers who are now pushing for 
nationalist policies in the United States and other developed countries. 
Moreover, as Ana Santos Rutschman noted in her contribution 
to this Symposium and in other articles written before the COVID-19 
pandemic, vaccine development often requires different incentive 
frameworks and funding arrangements.168 In developing countries, 
 
 166. Established during the cold war, the Non-Aligned Movement provides a 
forum for over 100 developing countries that do not align with any power bloc. See 
History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFS. 
(Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-
article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement 
[https://perma.cc/7SH5-HC3P] (providing the history of the Non-Aligned 
Movement). 
 167. See Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 15, at 1604–18 (discussing the H5N1 
avian influenza outbreak and the position taken by Indonesia and other countries). 
See generally VIRAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE CHANGING 
GLOBAL SYSTEM FOR SHARING PATHOGENS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH (Sam 
Halabi & Rebecca Katz eds., 2020) (collecting articles that explore the implications 
of viral sovereignty claims to global biomedical research and issues relating to the 
control and sharing of pathogens and related data). 
 168. As Professor Santos Rutschman observed: 
[I]n spite of the increasing burden posed by infectious diseases in 
the United States and abroad, the market for vaccines targeting 
emerging pathogens is often considered unprofitable. Globally, 
very few private companies currently engage in vaccine research 
and development …, and the public sector currently lacks the 
capacity to fully develop and manufacture new vaccines on its 
own. While the rates of vaccine-related patent applications 
increased, over time the number of new vaccines entering the 
market each year has remained relatively low. 
Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 
729, 731 (2019); see also Rutschman, Vaccine Markets, supra note 93, at 111 
(“Vaccines are often described as one of the most unprofitable types of 
biopharmaceutical goods, under-incentivized from a research and development … 
perspective, and routinely failing to attract sufficient investment from traditional 
funders in biopharma.”). Xue Qiwei and Lisa Ouellette concurred: 
[A]bsent significant government intervention in healthcare 
markets—such as mandatory or free vaccination—the prospect of 
monopoly profits will under-incentivize the development of 
vaccines relative to treatments. In particular, traditional market-
based [intellectual property] incentives may be specifically 
insufficient for promoting vaccine development, despite the 
outsized social benefits of vaccines. And IP [intellectual 
property]–based allocation is also ill-suited to the vaccine context, 
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efforts to distribute vaccines frequently encounter barriers that are 
unrelated to the intellectual property system;169 inadequate public 
health infrastructure is the oft-documented culprit170 behind the so-
called “last-mile problem.”171 As WIPO Director General Francis 
Gury reminded us, “there are many other policy challenges in the 
management of the COVID-19 crisis that are not directly related to 
[intellectual property] and innovation” and that do not involve the 
“question of [intellectual property] blocking access to vital medical 
vaccines, treatments or cures.”172 
Taken together, these three initiatives have shown that the 
debate on the modalities of protection is far from binary. While patents 
and regulatory exclusivities often come to mind when we explore the 
possible incentive frameworks to promote pharmaceutical innovation, 
there are many other policy options, incentive frameworks, and 
funding arrangements173 both within and outside the intellectual 
 
as illustrated most recently by the many calls to make any 
COVID-19 vaccine affordable and available to all. 
Qiwei Claire Xue & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy and the Market for 
Vaccines, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 7 (2020) (footnote omitted). 
 169. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 18, at 853 
(noting the need “to distinguish among the IP-relevant, IP-related, and IP-irrelevant 
factors and develop solutions that are tailored to each type of factor”). 
 170. See DAVIES, supra note 131, at 180 (“An inadequate number of health care 
workers to distribute the vaccine, community resistance, and the waxing and waning 
of donor interest all contribute to the premature end of vaccination projects.”); Ana 
Santos Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways from Recent 
Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 170, 174 (2020) (“Some 
types of vaccines—such as live virus vaccines—are particularly sensitive to 
temperature changes, a feature that poses enhanced problems in reaching vaccine 
markets in remote areas of the Global South.”); Adam Kamradt-Scott, Creating a 
COVID-19 Vaccine Is Only the First Step. It’ll Take Years to Manufacture and 
Distribute, CONVERSATION (Aug. 17, 2020), https://theconversation.com/creating-
a-covid-19-vaccine-is-only-the-first-step-itll-take-years-to-manufacture-and-
distribute-144352 [https://perma.cc/95J7-23PA] (“Most vaccines need to be 
transported in cold storage, which presents a problem for many parts of the world 
where electricity failure is a common feature of daily life.”); see also SCOWCROFT 
INST. OF INT’L AFFS., supra note 133, at 33 (“Diagnostics must be able to run without 
electricity and withstand temperature extremes and power surges, or they will be of 
limited use in many developing countries.” (citation omitted)). 
 171. Thomas Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Better Pharmaceutical 
Innovations at Much Lower Prices, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH, 
supra note 147, at 135, 141. 
 172. Gurry, supra note 107, ¶ 10. 
 173. Notable examples include open-source models, subsidies, grants, prizes, and 
advance market commitments. See Jorge L. Contreras, Expanding Access to Patents 
for COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 98, at 
158, 158 (“In addition to patents, which reward inventors for financially successful 
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property system.174 Thus, if we are to design effective policy 
responses to address a global pandemic, we will need to deploy a 
holistic and multidisciplinary approach to evaluate the different 
possibilities at the international, national, and sub-national levels.175 
V. CONCLUSION 
The COVID-19 pandemic has shown us firsthand that 
countries will need different policy responses to address a global 
pandemic. What works for the northern hemisphere may not work well 
for the southern hemisphere, especially if seasonal changes will affect 
the pandemic at issue.176 Likewise, what makes good policy sense in 
developed countries may generate bad or unintended consequences in 
the developing world.177 Because the COVID-19 pandemic has posed 
 
innovations, a range of other incentives such as prizes, grants, and subsidies … exist 
to motivate technological innovation.”). For discussions of grants, prizes, and 
advance market commitments, see generally TRILATERAL STUDY, supra note 54, at 
156–58; INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 147, 135–208; 
Michael Kremer et al., Designing Advance Market Commitments for New Vaccines, 
HARV. SCHOLAR (Dec. 2019) https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/kremer/files/amc_ 
design_36.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YE8-52D4]. 
 174. As Amy Kapczynski observed: 
IP scholarship has for decades been centered on a simple account: 
IP is necessary to achieve the information production that we as a 
society desire. But over the last few years, the field has come to 
recognize that IP as an approach has both significant costs and 
substantial limits. In response, an important new scholarly 
literature on “intellectual production without intellectual 
property,” or “IP without IP” has emerged. 
Kapczynski, supra note 153, at 1542–43 (footnotes omitted); see also Yu, A Half-
Century of Scholarship, supra note 75, at 1137 n.370 (collecting “IP without IP” 
scholarship). 
 175. See Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 15, at 1621–27 (discussing the need for 
holistic, multidisciplinary, socio-legal analysis of intellectual property law and 
policy). 
 176. See A. Odysseus Patrick & Max Bearak, Winter Is Coming South of the 
Equator, Along with Predictions of the Coronavirus’s Spread, WASH. POST (June 6, 
2020, 1:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/winter-is-coming-south-
of-the-equator-along-with-predictions-of-the-coronavirus-
spreading/2020/06/04/c0dd4c92-a4c9-11ea-898e-b21b9a83f792_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/P22X-RFLD] (“As countries in the Northern Hemisphere tilt into 
summer and emerge from months-long coronavirus shutdowns, winter arrives this 
month in subtropical parts of the Southern Hemisphere—and with it increased 
concern for the virus’s spread.”). 
 177. See Alex Broadbent, South Africa’s Leaders Have Had a Crack at COVID-
19: It’s Time to Give the People a Go, CONVERSATION (July 16, 2020, 12:03 PM), 
https://theconversation.com/south-africas-leaders-have-had-a-crack-at-covid-19-
its-time-to-give-the-people-a-go-142573 [https://perma.cc/B5AH-9CQE] (“[T]he 
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diverse policy challenges at the international, national, and sub-
national levels, it is high time we developed a deeper understanding of 
the different modalities of intellectual property protection, the 
interplay between these modalities, and the possibilities for incentive 
frameworks and funding arrangements outside the intellectual 
property system. It is my hope that this Symposium will help generate 
new ideas to improve the intellectual property system and to enhance 




leadership of a Malawian village came up with a solution to protect older people by 
locating them in one part of the village. Malawi never locked down but, with a very 
poor population, half of whom are 17 or under, it is really not clear why it should.”); 
Alex Broadbent & Benjamin T.H. Smart, Why a One-Size-Fits-All Approach to 
COVID-19 Could Have Lethal Consequences, CONVERSATION (Mar. 24, 2020, 1:29 
AM), https://theconversation.com/why-a-one-size-fits-all-approach-to-covid-19-
could-have-lethal-consequences-134252 [https://perma.cc/5MVV-7S2Q] (“In 
Africa, millions will starve if the global economy enters a protracted downturn. We 
must ask whether the number will be more than COVID-19 will kill in a region 
where only 6.09% of the population is over 65.”). 
